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Abstract
This Essay first explores the historical context of prisoner release in Ireland, North and South.
Second, the role of prisoners in the process of conflict resolution in the 1990s is examined in the
periods before and after the breakdown of the first IRA cease- fire. The provisions within the Good
Friday Agreement and subsequent legislation are then analyzed in so far as they relate to prisoner
release as an incentive for peace among organizations outside the peace process, decommissioning,
the victims of violence, and prisoner reintegration. Finally, this Essay argues that the “prisoner
issue” represents a crucial acknowledgement by the British government of the political character of
the conflict and suggests that such a view will be required by all the protagonists if the Agreement
is to survive.

PRISONERS, THE AGREEMENT, AND THE
POLITICAL CHARACTER OF THE
NORTHERN IRELAND CONFLICT
Kieran McEvoy*
INTRODUCTION
The inclusion of provisions relating to the early release of
paramilitary prisoners in the Good Friday Agreement' (or
"Agreement") was one of the most controversial aspects of the
Accord. In effect, practically all politically-motivated prisoners
belonging to organizations on cease-fire will be released within
two years of the scheme's commencement, by June 2000. This
Essay first explores the historical context of prisoner release in
Ireland, North and South. Second, the role of prisoners in the
process of conflict resolution in the 1990s is examined in the
periods before and after the breakdown of the first IRA ceasefire. The provisions within the Good Friday Agreement and subsequent legislation are then analyzed in so far as they relate to
prisoner release as an incentive for peace among organizations
outside the peace process, decommissioning, the victims of violence, and prisoner reintegration. Finally, this Essay argues that
the "prisoner issue" represents a crucial acknowledgement by
the British government of the political character of the conflict
and suggests that such a view will be required by all the protagonists if the Agreement is to survive.
"It doesn't make any of us feel comfortable or happy to talk
about releasing prisoners. But we also have to recognize that
unless there is some agreement on such things there can be no
'2
agreement at all in Northern Ireland.
The conflict in Northern Ireland has lead to a unique
prison system in which, over the past thirty years, between fifty
percent and seventy percent of prisoners have been imprisoned
* Kieran McEvoy is Assistant Director at the Institute of Criminology and Criminal

Justice, Queen's University of Belfast.
1. Agreement Reached in the Multi-Party Negotiations, Apr. 10, 1998 [hereinafter
Good Friday Agreement].
2. Interview by BBC Radio news with William Hague (Apr. 25, 1998), reproduced in
The HagueDefends His Supportfor Deal, IRISH NEWS, Apr. 25, 1998 (visited Apr. 16, 1999)
<http://www.irishnews.com/K.archive/250498/nnews5.html> (on file with the Fordham InternationalLaw Journal).
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for politically motivated offences, many of them serving long
sentences for the most serious of crimes. The prisons have
been one of the key practical and ideological battlegrounds of
the conflict. Paramilitary prisoners, particularly Republicans,
have been willing to kill prison staff, to destroy prison property,
to plan and execute escapes, and to hungerstrike until death, all
in the assertion of their status as "political" rather than "ordinary" prisoners. The British government, on the other hand,
has either viewed the prisons as crucial to a strategy designed to
"defeat" terrorism, particularly during the "criminalisation" era
of 1976-1981,' or at the very least, as a mechanism to remove the
"men of violence" from society while a political settlement was
sought among the "constitutional parties. '
The prisons have also played a key role in the political developments that have lead to the peace process and the Good Friday Agreement. It is widely acknowledged that the origins of
modern Sinn Frin as a political party lie in the political mobilization brought about during the hunger strike era of 1980 and
1981.6 Similarly, with regard to the development of the loyalist
3. ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE NORTHERN IRELAND PRISON SERVICE (HMSO, 19711998).
4. Criminalization was a strategy employed by the British government in Northern
Ireland between 1976-1981, which sought to delegitimize and to depoliticize those involved in paramilitary violence. Internment without trial was ended, as was "Special
Category Status" (in effect, de facto prisoner of war status), for convicted paramilitary
prisoners. There were attempts to remove all practical and symbolic differences between terrorist and ordinary prisoners including segregation by paramilitary faction
and the recognition of paramilitary command structures. Rigid enforcement of prison
rules such as the wearing of prison uniforms and carrying out prison work were viewed
as crucial in the attempts to "beat" the paramilitaries within the prisons. Allied to a
tough police-lead security policy, rigorous interrogations, and the increased deployment of smaller specialist army units such as the Special Air Service ("SAS"), the government's stated intention was to portray the conflict as a law and order or security problem rather than a "political" problem, and as such, real hope of the "defeat" of terrorism was held out. For a fuller exposition of implications of this managerial strategy in
the prisons, see Brian Gormally et al., CriminalJusticein a Divided Society: Northern Ireland
Prisons, 17 CRIME &JUST. 51-135 (1993). For an account of the prisoners' resistance to
criminalisation, see generally PADRAIG O'MALLEY, BITING AT THE GRAVE, THE IRISH
HUNGERSTRIKES AND THE POLITICS OF DESPAIR (1990); BRIAN CAMPBELL ET AL., NOR
MEEKLY SERVE My TIME: THE H BLOCK STRUGGLE 1976-1981 (1994).
5. See, e.g., STEVEN C. GREER, SUPERGRASSES: A STUDY IN ANTI-TERRORIST LAw ENFORCEMENT IN NORTHERN IRELAND (1995).
6. See generally LIAM CLARKE, THE H BLOCKS & THE RISE OF SINN FfIN (1987). As
Gerry Adams, President of Sinn Fain, has described,
In the months after the hunger strike, we all tried to recover from the emotion
and intensity of that period. All of us grieved, It was a time for reflection,
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parties associated with loyalist paramilitaries (the Progressive
Unionist Party (or "PUP") and the Ulster Democratic Party (or
"UDP")), they too are staffed and largely lead by former prisoners and would attribute much of their political philosophy to discussion that took place among prisoners in the Maze prison (formerly Long Kesh) in the 1970s and 1980s. 7 Serving prisoners,
ex-prisoners, and prisoners' families were a crucial constituency
in the Loyalist and Republican attempts at peace-building as
each. group moved towards their respective cease-fires. Neither
Republicanism nor Loyalism would have been able to move away
from political violence without the support of their prisoners,
and as is widely acknowledged, the Good Friday Agreement
could not have been concluded without provisions relating to
the early release of such prisoners.
I. THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF THE EARLY RELEASE OF
POLITICALLY-MOTIVATED PRISONERS IN IRELAND
Although it is little explored in the literature on conflict resolution and peace studies,8 the concept of the early release from
prison of former combatants has a prominent role in the international experience of political conflict.' More recently, the notion of the release of former combatants after a period of intereven as we intensified our publicity and propaganda efforts; as we reviewed the
standing of Sinn Fhin and the mood of our support base; as we learned the
lessons of mass mobilisation and popular actions, of electoralism and broad
front work.
GERRY ADAMS, BEFORE THE DAWN: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 316 (1996).
7. See generally JIM CUSACK & HENRY McDONALD, UVF (1997).
8. See MICHAEL VON TANGEN PAGE, PRISONS, PEACE AND TERRORISM: PENAL POLICY,
IN THE REDUCTION OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE, PRISONS (1998).
9. In 1995, the author (with Brian Gormally) carried out an international comparative study on the relevance of prisoner release to the process of conflict resolution in
South Africa, Italy, Spain, Israel/Palestine, and Ireland. That research focused upon
various thematic areas including definitional questions regarding political motivation,
the modalities of release, the role of victims, and reintegration, all of which were explicitly designed to feed into the debate on prisons in Northern Ireland. See BRIAN
GORMALLY & KIERAN McEvoY, NORTHERN IRELEAND ASSOCIATION FOR THE CARE AND RESETTLEMENT OF OFFENDERS, THE RELEASE AND REINTEGRATION OF POLITICALLY MOTIVATED

PRISONERS IN NORTHERN IRELAND:

A

COMPARATIVE STUDY OF SOUTH AFRICA, ISREAL/PAL-

(1995); Kieran
McEvoy, PrisonerRelease and Conflict Resolution: InternationalLessons for Northern Ireland,
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE REVIEW 8, 33-61 (1998). For a critical assessment of
ESTINE, ITALY, SPAIN, THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND AND NORTHERN IRELAND

the impact of that research, see Brian Gormally & Kieran McEvoy, The Northern Ireland

Conflict and Peacemaking Criminology, in
MacLean & D. Milovanovic eds., 1997).

THINKING CRITICALLY ABOUT CRIME

118-29 (B.
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state violence has become one of the mainstays of international
humanitarian law1" and indeed has been discussed as extending
to non-state combatants.1 1
One of the points often repeated during the course of the
discussions on prisoner release in Northern Ireland, particularly
by those who opposed such a move, was that it represented an
unprecedented interference with the operation of the criminal
justice process. As Ulster Unionist Security Spokesperson Ken
Maginnis argued, "early releases outside the judicial system have
never been made before. ' 12 In fact, however, there is a long
British history of doing exactly that. In Anglo-Saxon legal tradition, the power of the sovereign both to dispense and mitigate
punishments in the wake of battles or wars was viewed as appropriate to either individual offenders or classes of offenders from
at least the seventh century. The British Parliament has enacted
110 acts of general pardon or amnesty for various classes of offenders," most of whom were involved in political or civil conflicts of one form or another. In Ireland, after every period of
political violence since the fourteenth century, politically motivated offenders have been released from prison after hostilities
ceased. 4 An analysis of the various prisoner releases that have
occurred in the twentieth century, in particular, both South and
North of the border, offer crucial insights into this section of the
Good Friday Agreement.
A. PrisonerReleases in the South 1916-1962
Following the Easter Rising of 1916 and the execution of
many of the leaders of the Rising, the British government imprisoned and interned thousands of prisoners in Ireland, England,
10.

DIETER FLECK & MICHAEL BOETHE, THE HANDBOOK OF HUMANITARIAN LAW IN

(1995).
11. Laura Lopez, Uncivil Wars-The Challenge of Applying InternationalHumanitarian
Law to Internal Armed-Conflicts, 69 N.Y.U. L. REv. 916, 916-62 (1994).
12. MowlamJailHint BringsPoliticalFury, IRISH NEWS, Aug. 11, 1997 (visited Feb. 10,
1999) <http://www.irishnews.com/karchive/110897/newsl.html> (on file with the
Fordham InternationalLaw Journal).
13. Orro KIRCHHEIMER, POLITICAL JUSTICE: THE USE OF LEGAL PROCEDURE FOR
POLITICAL ENDS (1961).
14. Michael Mullan, Northern Ireland Association for the Care and Resettlement
of Offenders, Pardon and Amnesty in Ireland to 1937 (1995) (unpublished report on
file with the Fordham InternationalLaw Journal).
ARMED CONFLICTS
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and Wales. 5 Republican prisoners began to organize themselves in the prisons and to protest their status as political prisoners using tactics such as hunger strikes, destruction of prison
property, and escapes from prison. 6 From December 1916 onwards, after David Lloyd George had become British Prime Minister, the release of large numbers of prisoners was ordered to
"positively effect" public opinion in Ireland. In June 1917, a
Cabinet decision recommended the exercise of the "royal prerogative of mercy" to many prisoners, an amnesty in all but
name. 17 Of the seventy-three Sinn Fain candidates returned in
the 1918 election (twenty-six of them without a contest), half
were sentenced or interned prisoners at the time. Faced with
the decisive election result, the government began to release the
remaining prisoners from the Rising and all were out by April
1919.
After the Anglo/Irish War, and the partition of the island in
1920-1921, discussions between the governments of the Irish
Free State and Northern Ireland included the question of prisoner releases. At a meeting between Michael Collins, the Chairman of the Provisional Government in the South, and Northern
premier Sir James Craig in January 1922, Collins insisted on an
amnesty for those Republicans held in the North since before
the Treaty was signed.' The two leaders met again in February
and finally on March 30 signed an "Agreement between the Provisional Government and the Government of Northern Ireland."
The agreement included a provision that "[t]he two Governments shall, in cases agreed upon between the Signatories, arrange for the release of political prisoners in prison for offences
before the date hereof. No offences committed after the 31st
March, 1922, shall be open to consideration."' 9
In any event, no prisoners were freed as a result of the
March agreement, which became redundant with the outbreak
of Civil War in the South between those Republicans opposed to
the Treaty and the new Free State government who supported it.
15. See generally SEAN O'MAHONEY, FRONGOCH: UNIVERSITY OF REVOLUTION (1987).
16. EAR-L LONGFORD & THOMAS P. O'NEILL, EAMON DE VALERA 52-60 (1974).

17. GEORGE DANGERFIELD, THE DAMNABLE QUESTION: A STUDY IN ANGLO-IRISH RELATIONS 258 (1976).
18. See TIM PAT COOGAN, MICHAEL COLLINS 340 (1990).
19. Kevin Boyle, The Tallents Report on the Craig-Collins Pact of 30 March 1922, XII
IRISH JURIST 173-75 (1977).
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Before bringing military courts into operation, the Provisional
Government offered an amnesty on October 3, giving dissidents
twelve days to lay down their arms. 20 By March 1923, 12,000 Republican prisoners were held by Free State forces. By virtue of
the Indemnity (British Military) Act 192321 (the "Indemnity Act
1923"), "[n]o action or other legal proceedings whatsoever"
were allowed to be instituted against any person acting in the
service of the Crown from the eve of the Easter Rising on April
23, 1916, to date. Likewise, at the end of the civil war the Indemnity Act 1923 stopped proceedings in respect of any act done on
behalf of the Free State sinceJune 27, 1922, "in the course of the
suppression of the state of rebellion." De Valera, the leader of
the anti-treaty faction, resisted proposals by some IRA officers to
arrange a surrender of arms in exchange for an amnesty. 22 The
Indemnity Act 192423 had a wider scope applying to all parties in
the conflict and lead to all anti-treaty IRA prisoners being released.
In 1938, the IRA started a bombing campaign of targets in
Northern Ireland and in Britain.2 4 In 1939, to cope with both
the IRA campaign and the outbreak of the World War II, the
Irish government declared a state of emergency and introduced
internment once again. 25 Around two thousand people were interned during the war years under various provisions and hundreds were convicted by military courts. A Republican Prisoners'
Release Committee was established at the end of 1945 to press
for the release of remaining prisoners. The campaign grew in
strength, and, lead by Sean McBride, the newly-formed Clan na
Poblachta used the campaign as a vehicle in pursuing its electoral ambitions.2 6 Clan took ten Dail seats in the general election
of 1948 and formed a Coalition with Fine Gael. Within weeks of
the change of government, the last five IRA prisoners were released from Portlaoise by order of the new Minister for Justice. 2 7
In December 1956, the IRA formally started its "border cam20. TIM PAT COOGAN, THE IRA (1987).
21. Indemnity (British Military) Act, 1923 (Eng.).
22. See LONGFORD & O'NEILL, supra note 16, at 225.

23. Indemnity (British Military) Act, 1924, ch. 12 (Eng.).
24. J. BOWYER BELL, THE SECRET ARMY. THE IRA (1979).
25. JOSEPH J. LEE, IRELAND 1912-1985: POLITICS AND SocIETY 223 (1989).
26. SeeJOHN A. MURPHY, IRELAND IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1975); see also TIM
PAT COOGAN, ON THE BLANKET: THE H BLOCK STORY 26-27 (1980).
27. See BOWYER BELL, supra note 24, at 249.
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paign" with attacks on Northern Ireland. 28 On July 4, 1957, the
Irish Government introduced internment and by March 1958,
131 people were held in the Curragh. All were released, however, by March 11, 1959, a total of 206 having passed through the
gates. Sentenced prisoners stood trial before the Irish District
Courts and the Special Criminal Court composed of military officers. After a largely unsuccessful campaign, the IRA called a
cease-fire on February 26, 1962.29 Mountjoy prison held fortytwo IRA men at the time of the cease-fire. By April 20, 1962,
only twenty-nine IRA men remained, all of whom were unconditionally released on that date-representing a general amnesty,
granted less than two months after the end of the campaign.
In sum, the history of the Southern Irish state offers several
precedents for early release, or even general amnesty in the aftermath of a definitively concluded period of violent political
conflict. In the early years of the Southern Irish State, its very
survival depended partly on the process of genuine amnesty for
opponents. ° The broad precedent provided by the early releases of 1924, 1945, and 1962 would suggest that successive governments of the day, preferably with the agreement of the opposition, have sought to dispose of the question of prisoner release
in whatever lawful way appears to coincide with political expediency. Such a quintessentially pragmatic approach to prisoner release was reflected by Irish governments of varying political persuasions during the current peace process and is discussed below.
28. COOGAN, supra note 26, at 377.
29. "The leadership of the Resistance Movement has ordered the termination of
the campaign of resistance to British occupation ... all arms and other materials have
been dumped and all full-time active service volunteers have been withdrawn." Statement released by Irish Republican Publicity Bureau, Feb. 26, 1962.
30. This is not to suggest that the treatment of politically-motivated prisoners in
the South should be understood as more "soft" than their Northern or British counterparts. For example, during World War II, the De Valera-led Fianna Fail Government
allowed three IRA prisoners to hunger-strike to death in assertion of their status as
political rather than criminal prisoners. This was a tactic that he and a number of his
cabinet colleagues utilized for similar goals two decades earlier, leading to the charge
by the then Labour Leader William Norton, "am I to understand that hunger or thirst
strikes of this nature which were right in 1922, and 1923 are wrong in 1939?" 77 DAIL
DEB. col. 831 (Nov. 19, 1939). Rather, it could be argued that the approach taken in
the South toward the prisoner question after various cessations of hostilities has been
informed by a more intuitive understanding of the emotional and political significance
of the prisoner issue and its historic potential to become a destabilizing element of the
political landscape.
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B. Prison Releases in the North 1920-1962
After the formation of the Northern Ireland state in 1920,
one of the first actions by the newly-created provisional government was to introduce a state of emergency and intern those
suspected of being members of the IRA. Of these prisoners, 130
were ulimately released as part of the post-treaty releases. 3 ' As
discussed above, a number of Craig/Collins meetings provided
for the "release of political prisoners," but this release failed to
materialize when high levels of political violence continued.
Apart from those interned, the courts were busy trying and sentencing suspected IRA men, and the number of sentenced prisoners rose from 470 to 870 between April and October 1922.
With the civil war raging in the South, divisions in the ranks in
the North, and widespread loyalist violence and government repression, IRA activity petered out in the North by the autumn of
1922. Internment was ended in 1924 and internees were released. Sentenced prisoners were ultimately freed as a result of
the Tri-partite Agreement, between the British government and
the governments of the North and South, which was signed in
December 1925. The resulting decisions on prisoner release
were formed part of a package of concessions in return for in32
creased recognition of partition by the Free State government.
The outbreak of World War II lead to the reintroduction of
internment by the government in the North, in line with their
counterparts in the South. 3 By 1942, 802 suspected IRA men
had been interned.3 4 The IRA campaign of that era was seriously hampered by internments, jailing, and executions, both
North and South. The Northern government released all internee's at the end of the war. As in the 1920s, at the end of
World War II, the Northern government conditioned the release
of interned, politically-motivated prisoners upon them keeping
the peace.
However, some sentenced prisoners remained in
prison for several years after the war ended.3 6
31. See
32. See

MICHAEL FARRELL, NORTHERN IRELAND:

THE ORANGE STATE

EAMON PHOENIX, NORTHERN NATIONALISM:

(1976).

NATIONALISM, POLITICS AND THE

CATHOLIC MINORITY IN NORTHERN IRELAND 1890-1940, at 333-34 (1994).
33. See FRANCIS S.L. LYONS, IRELAND SINCE THE FAMINE (1983).

34.
(1983).

ROBERT FISK, IN TIME OF WAR:

ULSTER AND THE PRICE OF NEUTRALITY

35. SeeJOHN McGUFFIN, INTERNMENT (1973).
36. See FARRELL, supra note 31, at 168.

1939-1945
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After the IRA "border campaign," which lasted from 1956 to
1962, eighty-nine internees were released after signing a pledge
renouncing violence. Twenty-five sentenced prisoners, from a
total of ninety-four prisoners sentenced for serious offenses,
were released under the Royal Prerogative of Mercy. It appears
that some prisoners gave a verbal undertaking, and in seven
cases entered into a voluntary recognizance before a Resident
Magistrate to keep the peace and be of good character for a
number of years.3 7 The attitudes of the Northern Ireland judiciary during this period are instructive, as then Lord Chief Justice
MacDermott noted when sentencing a number of IRA prisoners
for an arms raid in Omagh.
It may well be that when you have time for reflection you will
wonder whether the sentences which I am about to pass can
be reduced or abated. Whether that will ever come to pass is
a matter for the executive government and not for me, but I
will say this, and if you do not heed it now I hope you will
later. It seems to me unlikely that your sentences will be curtailed unless at least two conditions are present-the first is
that you yourselves will have turned your backs on violence,
and the second is that the campaign of which you38are at once
the participants and the victims comes to a stop.
The response of the Unionist government to that IRA ceasefire is also of interest in 1999. Brian Faulkner, Minister of Home
Affairs at the time and later Prime Minister of Northern Ireland,
addressed the Stormount parliament on the day after the announcement. He began by repudiating "the implication... that
there are persons in my prisons serving sentences for political
offence," but later in a reply suggested that "persons who have
been sentenced for their part in political activities" could seek to
avail of the royal prerogative of mercy, as a number (unspecified) had already done. He suggested that he had "no intention
of authorizing a general release" and that "the abandonment of
the means to wage war will be an earnest of good faith; the retention of such will be an indication of the intent to resume the
campaign."3 9 Of the twenty-six IRA prisoners still in jail at the
end of the campaign, all were released by December 1963,
37. Confidential correspondence to the author from a Northern Ireland Office
source.
38. Omagh Arms Raid Trial Concludes, ULSTER NEWSLETTER, Dec. 16, 1954.
39. House of Commons, Official Report, Feb. 27, 1962, col. 1951 (N. Ir.).
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within one year of the cessation of hostilities, with undertakings
neither sought nor given and no hand over of IRA weapons.40
The experiences of prisoner release in the North since partition are instructive for a number of reasons. First, although
releases occurred more slowly in the North than in the South,
the fact that they took place at all is significant given Unionist
misgivings that Republicans would resume attacks on the Northern State. Second, Unionist ministers appeared more concerned with the symbolism of recognizing the political character
of the IRA than their Southern counterparts. Third, as suggested by Faulkner's statement, there was a precedent of linking
prisoner release to the question of the decommissioning of
paramilitary weapons, although no such decommissioning took
place. All of these factors featured heavily in Unionist discourses
on prisoner release in the North during the current peace process.
C. PrisonerRelease and the 1994 Cease-Fires
The period before the IRA and Loyalist cease-fires in 1994
was preceded by intense discussions and negotiations within the
ranks of the respective movements including the prisoners. One
former Republican prisoner has suggested to the author that an
earlier version of the discussion document sometimes referred
to as Totally Unarmed Strategy ("TUAS"), which laid out the potential for a non-violent Republican strategy, had actually circulated among Republican prisoners in the early 1990s. 41 Certainly in the period before the announcement of the cease-fire
on August 31, 1994, the leadership of the IRA prisoners was con40. Confidential correspondence, supra note 37.
41. Interview with former IRA life sentenced prisoner (Jan. 17, 1996). The document referred to as Totally Unarmed Strategy ("TUAS") outlined the favorable national
and international political configuration for progress on Republican goals in the absence of armed struggle. Such factors included a sympathetic Fianna Fail lead administration in Dublin, John Hume's leadership of the SDLP, the interest of the U.S. Presidency and the Irish American Lobby, and the unpopularity of the then Conservative
government with fellow members of the European Union. For a more detailed discussion, see EAMONN MALLIE & DAVID McKIrrRICK, THE FIGHT FOR PEACE: THE SECRET
STORY OF THE IRISH PEACE PROCESS (1996). Some commentators critical of the peace
process suggested in the wake of the breakdown of the first IRA cease-fire in 1996 that
TUAS might in fact mean "Tactical Use of Unarmed Struggle." See, e.g.,
Eoghan Harris,
Sinn Fin Line a Recipe for Strife, IRISH TIMES, Dec. 24, 1996.
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fident of the shape of the political settlement to come. As the
then IRA Officer Commander Sean Lynch indicated:
[We] are a product of the political conflict. Within a negotiated settlement prisoners are one of the issues which need to
be addressed. If there's a solution all prisoners should be released immediately. John Major might say differently, but all
on this wing know that once there's a solution we're
the men
2
out.

4

The Loyalists also worked hard to ensure that their prisoners were involved in the discussions that lead to the Loyalist
cease-fire in October 1994. In the weeks preceding the ceasefire declaration, leading loyalists politicians were permitted to
visit their prisoners in the Maze. The Ulster Defence Association, the largest Loyalist paramilitary grouping, in particular indicated that any cease-fire was explicitly predicated upon the
support of its prisoners and indeed suggested at one stage that
the cease-fire announcement should take place at the Maze car
park to underline the prisoners' importance.4" Unlike its Republican counterparts, who had commended "the political prisoners who had sustained the struggle against all the odds for the
past 25 years,14 4 the Loyalist cease-fire statement "solemnly
promised to leave no stone unturned to secure their [the prisoners] freedom. 45
This subtle difference in emphasis was to characterize the
behavior of both sets of protagonists in their attitudes to political
engagement after the first cease-fires. The British government
instigated preliminary discussions between civil servants and rep42. Inside the Maze, GUARDIAN, Feb. 21, 1994 (interview with Sean Lynch, IRA Officer Commanding Maze Prison).
43. See CUSACK & McDONALD, supra note 7, at 319. Senior figures within the PUP,
the political wing of the UVF (the other major Loyalist paramilitary faction), have suggested to the author that while UVF prisoners were a crucial constituency in the preparations for peace, they were regarded as another battalion of the UVF and appear to
have less power over political direction than their UDA counterparts in the Maze. Interview with Senior PUP Figures (Dec. 2, 1994). The Loyalist cease-fire was ultimately
announced in Fernhill House Estate, a training ground for the original Ulster Volunteer Force, which had drilled there at the beginning of the century in preparation for
their armed resistance to the introduction of Home Rule in Ireland.
44. Statement issued by the Irish Republican Publicity Bureau for the Irish Republican Army on August 31, 1994, declaring a complete cessation of military operations.
45. Statement issued by the Combined Loyalist military Command declaring a cessation of operational hostilities (visited Feb. 10, 1999) <http://www.uhb.fr/Langues/
Cei/cfloy94.htm> (on file with the Fordham InternationalLaw Journal).
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resentatives from Sinn Fein and the fringe Loyalist parties in December 1994. According to one former government negotiator
who attended those meetings:
[All] the Loyalists wanted to talk about was prisoners. I suppose they had come to the conclusion that the Union was
safe, therefore the main issue on their agenda was the prisoners. The 'Shinners' [Sinn Fain] however seemed reluctant to
be drawn on discussions regarding prisoners.. .we tried4 6to get
them to engage in it but they were having none of it.
While Republicans did establish a pressure group "Saoirse"
to campaign for the release of politically-motivated prisoners following the first IRA cease-fire, they appeared concerned to avoid
a focus upon the prisoner issue from diluting their negotiating
position on other matters such as constitutional change. As one
IRA prisoner interviewed by the author in 1996 argued, "I did
not go to prison to get out of prison movement on prisoners will
not suffice."4 7 Nonetheless, the British government's failure to
move on prisoner issues, even on humanitarian issues such as
the transfer of prisoners back to Northern Ireland to be closer to
their families, an idea that had been part of government policy
since the early 1990s, was seen as indicative of the general lack of
good will by a Conservative administration apparently motivated
by "the negativity of mistrust."48
The Irish government quickly recognized the political importance of the prisoner issue and began freeing prisoners
within months of the 1994 cease-fire, releasing a total of thirtysix of the seventy IRA members held in the Republic's jails by
49
February 1996 in order to "consolidate the peace process.
46. Confidential source.
47. Interview with former IRA prisoner (Dec. 11, 1995).
48. See TIM PAT COOGAN, THE TROUBLES: IRELAND'S ORDEAL 1966-1995 AND THE
SEARCH FOR PEACE 381 (1995).
49. Freed IRA Members Against Renewed Cease-fire, IRISH TIMES, June 10, 1998. The
significance of the interplay between pragmatism and political symbolism was highlighted in January 1995 when the Irish Government announced their intention to use
the provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 1960 to release IRA prisoners. That act had
originally been intended to facilitate the temporary release of "ordinary prisoners." A
number of the nine IRA prisoners scheduled for release argued that such a mechanism
undermined their status as political prisoners and argued that they would not leave
unless release was granted under Section 33 of the Offences Against the State Act, the
emergency legislation under which they were tried. The Government relinquished and
the prisoners were given permanent release under the emergency legislation on the
condition that they did not, "through publicity or otherwise, do anything which might
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While releases were halted as a result of the breakdown of the
IRA cease-fire in February 1996, they began again within weeks
of the announcement of the restoration of that cease-fire in July
199750 and continued before and after the signing of the Good
Friday Agreement.
The response by the then British government to the 1994
cease-fires in general and to the prisoner issue in particular, has
been widely criticized.5 1 Eventually, in December 1995, over a
year after the cease-fires, the government reintroduced fifty percent remission rates for paramilitary prisoners. The government
emphasized that the move was designed to bring remission rates
into line with the position of paramilitaries prior to 1989 and
with "ordinary" prisoners, who had always been entitled to fifty
percent remission, rather than as a positive contribution towards
peace-building. 52 The legislative mechanism that was used explicitly restricted flexibility on future increases in remission
rates. Furthermore, with paramilitary prisoners being released
on license with increased powers to revoke such licenses (a condition not applicable to "ordinaries"), the measure was widely
viewed by prisoners' groupings as "minimalist and begrudging.53
In the context of a failure to move on other key demands of
Sinn F~in and the Loyalist parties, such as the beginning of all
party negotiations and the continued insistence on the decommissioning of paramilitary weapons, many view the mishandling
of the prisoner issue by the then British government as symbolic
of a broader failure to accept the political character of the conflict. The IRA cease-fire ended on February 9, 1996. As one Republican activist told the author:
I wouldn't say the prisoner issue broke the first cease-fire because it didn't. However it was viewed as symptomatic, it was
cause annoyance to, or distress to any person or to the family or friends of any person
who may have been affected by the offences which led to their imprisonment." Id.
50. More Releases of Republican PrisonersMay Be on the Way, IRISH NEWS, Aug. 14, 1997
(visited Feb. 9, 1999) <http://www.irishnews.com/karchive/140897/newsI0.html>
(on file with the Fordham InternationalLaw Journal).
51. For a critical overview of the British government's response to the first IRA
and Loyalist cease-fires, see Kieran McEvoy & Brian Gormally, Seeing Is Believing: Positivistic Terrorology, Peacemaking Criminology and the Northern Ireland Peace Process, 8 CRITICAL
CRIMINOLOGY 1, 9-30 (1997).

52. House of Commons, Official Report, Oct. 30, 1995, cols. 21-71.
53. Interview with former UVF prisoner (Nov. 5, 1995).
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one matter over which the Brits had complete discretion and
they blew it. It was hard to convince anyone they were serious
when they wouldn't even transfer prisoners back to be near
their families. When they did finally move on releases towards the end of 1995 it was far too little too late.54
II. PRISONERS, THE RENEWED IRA CEASE-FIRE, AND
NEGOTIATING THE AGREEMENT
In the period following the breakdown of the first IRA
cease-fire, and with the Loyalist cease-fire showing considerable
strain evidenced by a number of attacks on Catholic civilians,
back bench MP Conservative Andrew Hunter suggested that the
Tory government should consider reducing Loyalist prisoners'
sentences in order to encourage the maintenance Of the Loyalist
cease-fire.5 5 While the then Conservative government did not
take up this suggestion, the lessons of the failures of the first IRA
cease-fire appeared to have been internalized by the Labour government that replaced the Conservatives with a massive majority
in May 1997.
When Tony Blair took office, he resolved to give Sinn Fain
one more opportunity to join the Northern Ireland peace talks
that had begun in June 1996, and from which Sinn Fain had
been excluded because of the lack of an IRA cease-fire.5 6 Following intensive discussions between the two governments and John
Hume, the leader of the SDLP, as well as preliminary meetings
with Sinn F6in, the British government published an Aide Memoir, in essence meeting the Republicans' widely-stated requirements for a restoration of the IRA cease-fire. In return for a
restoration of the 1994 cessation, Sinn Fain would be guaranteed
entrance to the talks within six weeks of a cease-fire, the talks
would be concluded by an agreed deadline of May 1998, and the
decommissioning issue would be resolved as envisaged in the
Mitchell Report rather than as a pre-condition to substantive negotiations.5 7 That Aide Memoir also recognized "the particular
54. Interview with Sinn Fain activist (Jan. 21, 1999).
55. Move to Cut Loyalist Prison Sentences, IRISH TIMES, Oct. 14, 1996 (visited Feb. 10,
1999) <http://www.irish-times/paper/1996/html> (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal).
56. Prime Minister Tony Blair, Speech at The Royal Ulster Agricultural Show, Belfast (May 16, 1997) (transcript on file with the Fordham InternationalLaw Journal).

57.

NORTHERN IRELAND INFORMATION SERVICE, AIDE MEMOIR SETTING OUT BRITISH
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sensitivities of prisoner issues on all sides."58 OnJuly 19, the IRA
restored its complete cessation of military operations.
The refreshing pragmatism of the new Labour government 59 quickly manifested itself in the area of prisoners. In August, less than a month after the IRA cease-fire, Dr. Marjorie
Mowlam indicated that while she was not yet ready to consider
prisoner releases "as the cease-fire holds, other options become
possible. ' 60 The reticence shown by the Republicans during the
first cease-fire, with respect to discussing prisoners also appeared
to have dissipated in the context of prisoners release as part of
the all party peace negotiations, rather than in bilateral negotiations with civil servants. In September 1997, on a visit to the
Maze and Maghaberry prisons, Sinn F~in Chief Negotiator Martin McGuinness assured IRA prisoners in the Maze and
Maghaberry that "their release and the transfer and release of
prisoners from England was a priority for us and that there
settlement without the release of all
could be not be a 6peace
1
prisoners.
political
The British government's willingness to engage realistically
on the prisoner issue was severely tested when UDA prisoners
voted in January 1998 to withdraw their support for the peace
process. 62 As noted above, UDA prisoners appeared to exercise
considerably greater influence over their political wing, the
UDP, than their counterparts in the IRA and UVF wings of the
Maze. With a number of killings carried out over the Christmas
1997 period, some of them subsequently admitted by the UDA,
GOVERNMENT'S POSITION ON THE ENTRY OF SINN FEIN INTO POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

TALKS (June 15, 1997).
58. Id.
59. In 1996, a similar formulation that led to the renewal of the IRA cease-fire had

been offered to John Major's Government and rejected as "not properly fitting the
Government's position." NORTHERN IRELAND INFORMATION SERVICE, GOVERNMENT
STATEMENT ON NORTHERN IRELAND (1998) (on file with the Fordham InternationalLaw

Journal).
60. MowlamJail Hint Brings PoliticalFury, IRISH NEWS, Aug. 11, 1997 (visited Feb. 10,
1999) <http://www.irishnews.com/k.archive/110897/newsll.html> (on file with the
Fordham InternationalLaw Journal).
61. Sinn FinBriefs IRA Prisoners,IRISH NEWS, Sept. 19, 1997 (visited Feb. 10, 1999)
<http://www.irishnews.com/k archive/190997/news13.html> (on file with the Fordham
InternationalLaw Journal).
62. UDA Prisoners ReJect Peace, IRISH NEWS, Jan. 5, 1998 (visited Feb. 10, 1999)
<http://www.irishnews.com/karchive/050198/newsl3.html> (on file with the Fordham
InternationalLaw Journal).
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the Secretary of State took the decision to go into the prison and
speak directly to the leadership of the UDA prisoners. This decision was a remarkable event, given that much of the past thirty
years had been characterized by a refusal (formally at least) by
the British government to recognize paramilitary command
structures within the prisons. A fourteen point document was
presented to the UDA prisoners, which included provisions on
the question of early release.6 3 In what was widely perceived to
have been a huge political gamble, Dr. Mowlam successfully persuaded the UDA prisoners to reverse their decision and to reinstate their support for the peace process.64
As indicated to the UDA prisoners, in February 1998 the
British government submitted a paper to the Liaison Sub committee on Confidence Building measures regarding prisoners.
The British Government, having received position papers from a
number of the political parties (UDP, PUP, SDLP, Sinn F6in,
and the Irish Government-the rest of the parties did not address the issue), indicated a willingness to "work out an account
of what could happen in respect of prisoner releases in the context of a peaceful and lasting settlement being agreed."6 5 In effect, the government's position had clearly moved from whether
prisoner release would happen, to a view on the modalities of
release and the role of prisoners in the overall settlement.
For those individuals involved in negotiating the section of
the agreement dealing with prisoners on behalf of Sinn F6in and
the Loyalist parties, the first of their key objectives was to ensure
that the process for release would be completed within an
63. "We [the British government] recognise that prisoner issues are important to
parties on both sides. They too need to be resolved, alongside progress on other issues,
to the satisfaction of the participants in the process. We have responsibility to maintain
community confidence in the criminal justice system and in the political process. We
are prepared in the liaison committees on confidence building measures to discuss
parties concerns and to work out an account of what would happen in respect of prisoner releases in the context of an overall political settlement being agreed." See Prisoners Fate Tied to Settlement, IRISH NEWS, Jan. 10, 1998 (visited Feb. 10, 1999) <http://
www.irishnews.com/k-archive/100198/news5.html> (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal) (reprinting statement by British government).
64. See She's Brave, She's Crazy, ULSTER NEWSLETIER, Jan. 9, 1998; The Gamble Pays
Off: Loyalists Prisoners Their Position After Talks with Mowlam, IRISH TIMES, Jan. 10. 1998;
Brendan Anderson, New Hope as Maze Gamble Pays Off IRISH NEWS, Dec. 10, 1998; Finding Hope in the Maze, GUARDIAN, Jan. 10, 1998.
65. LIAISON SUB-COMMI'17EE ON CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES, THE BRITISH GovERNMENT, PRISON ISSUES, (Feb. 4, 1998).
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agreed time-frame. As Progressive Unionist prisons spokesperson William Smith indicated in March 1998, "[t] he PUP will not
entertain any agreement that does not include a comprehensive
release scheme to begin at the point of the agreement and
within a given time frame."6 6 In the final hours of negotiation,
as a two year time frame for completion of the releases emerged
as the most likely outcome, a number of remarkable events occurred including an approach by senior Republican Gerry Kelly
to the Loyalists for an agreement on a one-year time scale.67 The
other key objective, also ultimately successful, was to ensure that
prisoner release was not conditioned upon prior decommissioning of paramilitary weapons.
For mainstream Unionists, the provisions relating to all
qualifying prisoners being released within two years were clearly
among the most unpalatable elements of the Agreement. A
number of senior figures within the Ulster Unionist Party, such
as Jeffrey Donaldson, dissented from the leadership on the day
the Agreement was concluded on the specific issues of prisoner
release and the failure to address decommissioning.6" The British government made frantic efforts to minimize the consequences of the releases, including a much copied hand written
note from the Prime Minister's Chief of Staff, dated the day of
the Agreement, pointing out the high numbers of prisoners who
would have been released in any case under existing remission
arrangements. 69 The final draft of the prisoner section of the
Agreement provided for the establishment of an independent
commission in both North and South, excluded organizations
not on cease-fire, contained a two-year time frame, created a
deadline for enacting enabling legislation of June 1998, and
made specific reference to the need for appropriate reintegration mechanisms for paramilitary prisoners.7 °
66. Prisoner Releases Crucial Says PUP, IRISH NEws, Mar. 20, 1998 (visited Feb. 10,
1999) <http://www.irishews.com/k_archive/200398/nnews7.html> (on file with the
Fordham InternationalLaw Journal).
67. Interview with Sinn Fin activist (Jan. 25, 1999). Acording to Sinn Fin, the
Loyalists rejected Kelly's approach.
68. See Donaldson's Fears Centre on Weapons and Prisoners, BELFAST TELEGRAPH, May
18, 1998.
69. Hand Written Note from Jonathon Powell, Prime Minister's Chief of Staff, to
Ken Maginnis MP, Apr. 10, 1998.
70. 1. Both Governments will put in place mechanisms to provide for an accelerated programme for the release of prisoners, including trans-
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A. Prisoners and the Referenda Campaign
In the weeks and months following the conclusion of the
Agreement, during the referenda in North and South to implement its provisions and the subsequent elections to the Northern Ireland Assembly, prisoners were to remain at the top of the
political agenda. As Sinn Fain prepared for its historic Ard Fheis
party conference to consider the party's view of the Agreement
and the difficult question of moving away from its abstentionist
past to take up seats in the Northern Assembly, Republicans requested the temporary release of a number of prisoners to address the conference. Both the British and Irish governments
accepted the importance of a public endorsement from the prisoners to the Republican party faithful. In total, twenty-seven IRA
prisoners were given parole for the Ard Fheis, two from
Maghaberry, eight from Portlaoise prison in the Republic, and
the rest from the Maze. 7 '

Among those present at the Sinn Fain rally were a number
of prisoners who had recently been transferred from Britain to
the Irish Republic (the "Balcombe Street Gang"). These prisoners, the longest serving Republicans who had each served twentytwo years in British prisons, received an emotional and tumultuferred prisoners, convicted of scheduled offences in Northern Ireland
or, in the case of those sentenced outside Northern Ireland, similar
offences (referred to hereafter as qualifying prisoners). Any such arrangements will protect the rights of individual prisoners under national and international law.
2. Prisoners affiliated to organisations which have not established or are
not maintaining a complete and unequivocal cease-fire will not benefit
from the arrangements. The situation in this regard will be kept under
review.
3. Both Governments will complete a review process within a fixed time
frame and set prospective release dates for all qualifying prisoners. The
review process would provide for the advance of the release dates of
qualifying prisoners while allowing account to be taken of the seriousness of the offences for which the person was convicted and the need
to protect the community. In addition, the intention would be that
should the circumstances allow it, any qualifying prisoners who remained in custody two years after the commencement of the scheme
would be released at that point.
4. The Governments will seek to enact the appropriate legislation to give
effect to these arrangements by the end of June 1998.
Good Friday Agreement, supra note 1, Prisoners.
71. High Profile Prisoners at Ard Fheis, IRISH TIMES, May 11, 1998 (visited Feb. 9,
1999) <http://www.irish-times.com/irish-timesa/paper/ 1998/0511/html> (on file with
the Fordham InternationalLaw Journal).
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ous welcome. Michael O'Brien, Officer Commanding of the
IRA prisoners in Portlaoise, used the example of these prisoners
in his speech in favor of taking up seats in the Northern Assembly. 72 With support also forthcoming from the IRA's Officer
Commanding in the Maze and the female prisoners at
Maghaberry, the Sinn F6in leadership secured an overwhelming
majority for the Agreement and its strategy to take up their
seats.7 3
While the unequivocal backing of the prisoners undoubtedly eased the passage of dramatic changes in Republican policy,
the televised images of IRA bombers being cheered and lauded
as heroes had a predictably negative effect among Unionists in
the North. While those Unionist led by David Trimble
campaigning for a 'Yes" vote in the referendum had established
an early pole lead, the images emanating from the Sinn Fain Ard
74
Fheis have been well described as "Christmas for the No Vote.
Unionist sources claimed that the Unionist 'Yes" vote dropped
by ten percent in the immediate aftermath of the Dublin Conference. 75 While Irish Premier Bertie Ahern defended his and the
British government's decision to release the prisoners for the
72. You may ask what has this got to do with the proposed assembly. It is this:
after 23 years in British prisons, these men are our own Mandelas. They are
fit, they are strong, they are unbowed, humorous, politically astute and aware,
and they are full of honest opinion and integrity. And all of that comes on the
back of trust, belief and above all, unity during those 23 years in the belly of
the beast .... United we can do whatever we want,just as those united POW's
who have returned from England have endured and ultimately defeated the
most barbaric prison system and conditions.
Statement of Michael O'Brien of the Portlaoise Martyrs cumann i Portlaoise Prisom, to
delegates of the Northen Ireland assembly, reprinted in Michael O'Regan, Huge Votes in
Favor of Taking Seats in Assembly, IRISH TIMES, May 11, 1998 (visited Feb. 10, 1999)
<http://www.irish-times/paper/1998/0511/html> (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal).
73. See Ard Fheis Ends with Historic Yes Vote, IRISH NEws, May 11, 1998 (visited Feb.
10, 1998) <http://www.irishnews.com/k_archive/110598/news.html> (on file with the
Fordham InternationalLaw Journal). In fact, 331 of the 350 eligible delegates at the Ard
Fheis voted in favour of Sinn Fhin taking up their seats in the Assembly. See O'Regan,
supra note 72.
74. Prisonersat Ardfheis - Christmasfor the No Lobby: The PrisonersIssue Could Damage
the Yes Vote in Northern Ireland, IRISH TIMES, May 12, 1998 (visited Feb. 10, 1999) <http://
www.irish-times.com/irish-times/paper/1998/0512/html> (on file with the Fordham InternationalLaw Journal).
75. See Deaglan de Breadun, Unionist Support for Agreement Drops Sharply, IRISH
TIMES, May 15, 1998 (visited Feb. 9, 1999) <http://www.irish-times.com/irish-times/paper/1998/0515.htnl> (on file with the Fordham InternationalLaw Journal).
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Ard Fheis, reminding the Dail that prisoners "had been a significant force for peace and the agreement," he criticized the triumphant tone of the prisoners' welcome. 76 A UDP event held later
in the week in Belfast, at which leading UDA prisoner Michael
Stone, who was out on home leave, was treated to a similar
hero's welcome did little to assuage Unionist concerns.77 While
the Unionist 'Yes" vote did recover to some extent in the final
days of the campaign, the prisoners question remained the most
commonly identified reason for voting against the Agreement by
Unionist voters.78
Both of these events illustrated the complex balancing act
required in the management of the prisoners issue within the
,peace process. The laudable pragmatism shown by both governments in using flexibility on prisoner issues to encourage Republicans and Loyalists away from their violent past, was offset by the
serious misgivings held by large sections of Unionism towards
prisoner release. While Nationalists appeared to accept prisoner
release for the most part as necessary in the process, most
Unionists, beyond the small electorate of the PUP and UDP, did
79

not.

B. The PrisonerRelease Legislation
The interaction between prisoner release and peacemaking
is sometimes viewed in terms of a "carrot and stick" approach,
wherein releases are viewed as one incentive towards ending violence and released prisoners may become "hostages" to ensure
the continuance of the cease-fires.8 ' Although the view of prisoners as "hostages" or "negotiating cards" has featured in some
76. Ahern Hits Out at IRA Triumphalism, IRISH NEWS, May 15, 1998.
77. Crowd Hails Stone Hero, BELFAST TELEGRAPH, May 15, 1998.

78. The releases of paramilitary prisoners was cited by fifty percent of those Official Unionist voters intending to vote "No" in the Referendum in polling a week before
the Referendum. Irish Times Mori Poll, reported in IRISH TIMES, May 11, 1998. As one
Northern Ireland Office pollster reported,
The prisoners issue is dominating [Protestant] views of the referendum. What
does it mean? They think it means something more fundamental than just the
moral outrage .... The prisoner issue becomes a symbol in their minds of a
fundamental flaw, a kind of real concern, a worry, a heartache, a deeply emotional issue which then dominates everything else.
Say Hello to Gunmen, Wave Goodbye to Peace?, SUNDAY TRIBUNE, May 17, 1998.
79. The possible reasons for the differences in views between the two main communities is discussed below.
80. BRENDAN O'LEARY, FREE THE GUNMEN (1997).
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of the discussions on prisoner release, such views are not afforded much expression in the legislation that gave effect to
commitments in the Agreement. Where the carrot and stick
metaphor may perhaps be of more analytical use is in relation to
the question of prisoner release and encouraging recalcitrant organizations into the peace processes, as well as in the notion of
prisoner release as a lever to secure concessions from paramilitary organizations with respect to decommissioning. Together
with these two areas (perhaps better understood within a framework of reconciliation and healing), the issues of prisoner release and victims and the reintegration of paramilitary prisoners
make up the four key areas covered by the prisoner release provisions in the Agreement.
Before examining those issues, it might be useful to offer a
brief overview of the way in which prisoner release is given effect
under the Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act"' (or "Sentences
Act") in the North and the Criminal Justice (Release of Prisoners) Act 2 in the Republic. Under the Northern Ireland
(Sentences) Act, an independent commission was established
with the responsibility for overseeing the release of "qualifying"
paramilitary prisoners. The membership of that Commission included a number of prominent individuals who had long argued
for the release of paramilitary prisoners.8 3 Qualifying prisoners
are defined in the Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act as prisoners convicted of a scheduled or "terrorist offence" before April
10, 1998, when the Agreement was signed. In addition, a qualifying prisoner must not be a supporter of an organization not on
cease-fire. Furthermore, if released, a qualifying prisoner must
not be likely to become a supporter of such an organization.
81. Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act, 1998, ch. 35 (Eng.).
82. CriminalJustice (Release of Prisoners) Act 1998 (Ir.).
83. In an appointment of considerable symbolic importance, Brian Currin, former
chair of the Amnesty Commission in South Africa, which had released politically-motivated prisoners in South Africa after Mandela became President in 1994, was appointed
co-chair along with retired civil servant Sir John Blelloch. In addition to his South
African experience, Curran had been associated with a number of initiatives in Northern Ireland and Britain between 1995 and 1998 organized by NIACRO (the Northern
Ireland Association for the Care and Resettlement of Offenders) as part of NIACRO's
campaign on the release of paramilitary prisoners. With the appointment of the
NIACRO Chief Executive, a member of the NIACRO Executive Committee, and a
prominent Northern Ireland human rights lawyer, as well a range of independent experts from outside Northern Ireland, the make-up of the Commission's membership
appeared designed to ensure a pragmatic approach to prisoner release.
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Lastly, with respect to life sentenced prisoners, the prisoner must
be someone who, if released immediately, would not be a danger
to the public.14 The power of the Secretary of State to "specify"
organizations under Section 3 provides for both a monitoring
function in ensuring that organizations maintain their "complete and unequivocal" cease-fires and allowing sufficient flexibility to encourage organizations not on cease-fire to declare a
cessation and thus ultimately to ensure that their prisoners will
benefit from the early release mechanisms."'
The process for releasing prisoners is that prisoners are encouraged to make applications for release to the commission,
446 of which were received by the Commission by August 21,
1998.86 These applications are then passed to the Northern Ireland Prison Service for confirmation of the accuracy of the details with respect to the offenses and sentences and for confirmation that the prisoner belonged to a group eligible for release.
When these applications are returned to the Commission, the
prisoners are given "preliminary indication" of whether they will
be freed early. This "preliminary indication" is then followed by
a substantive determination. 7 Prisoners serving fixed term
sentences have their sentences reduced by two-thirds.8" For prisoners sentenced for life, the Commission calculates how long
these prisoners would have normally served and reduces it by
one third." Any remaining prisoners are released byJune 2000.
Dissatisfied prisoners may appeal to a different panel of Commissioners or may request a judicial review of the decisions. The
Secretary of State retains an overall power to suspend or later to
revive the scheme or to prevent the release of a person adjudged
to be failing to meet any of the criteria outlined above."0 As of
84. Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act, 1998, ch. 35, § 3 (Eng.).
85. Id.
86. See Prisoners Out in A Fortnight, IRISH NEWS, Aug. 21, 1998.
87. Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act, 1998, §§ 14-15.
88. Id. § 4(1)(a).
89. Id.§ 6(1)(a).
90. Id. § 16. There has been considerable media speculation that the Secretary of
State has come under pressure from the police to delay the release of high profile UDA
prisonerJohnny "Mad Dog" Adair for fear that he would use his paramilitary infrastructure to engage in the illegal drugs trade. See RUC Plea to Keep 'Mad Dog' in Jail, SUNDAY
TIMES, Jan. 3, 1999; RUC Silent on Adair Claim, IRsH NEWS, Jan. 4, 1999 (visited Mar. 13,
1999) <http://www.irishnews.com/karchive/040199/nnews2/html> (on file with the
Fordham InternationalLaw Journal).
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January 26, 1999, approximately 240 paramilitary prisoners have
been released in the North under this scheme.
In the Irish Republic, a similar scheme has been introduced, albeit with the commission made up largely of officials in
the Department of Justice. Given the Irish government's previous willingness to release prisoners, fresh legislation was perhaps
not technically required. However, the Irish government was apparently well aware of the political and symbolic significance of
creating a specific post-Agreement release process. As Minister
for Justice John O'Donoghue explained:
While specific legislation is not necessary to allow effect to be
given to the releases envisaged in the Agreement, a broader
political issue is at stake. There is agreement on all sides of
the House that we should do nothing which might be open to
the perception that we are not complying fully with all the
terms of the Agreement and in those circumstances there will
be general support for the Bill. 9 1
Releases recommenced in the Irish Republic almost immediately
after the new Commission was established and have included the
man convicted of the murder of Lord Louis Mountbatten in
1979.92 Together with the equivalent legislation for the North,
these provisions may be understood in four key areas.
1. Prisoner Release as an Incentive to Peace for Dissident
Paramilitary Groupings: The Carrot?
The provisions for the release of prisoners in both jurisdictions permitted for the exclusion of those groups initially opposed to the peace process and those who continued to engage
in armed actions. These groupings included the Loyalist Volunteer Force ("LVF"), the Irish National Liberation Army
("INLA"), the Continuity IRA, and the "Real" IRA. In the event
of a cease-fire being declared by any of these organizations, however, the legislation was sufficiently flexible to allow the respective governments to recognize such cessations. This strategy, al91. Irish Minister for Justice, Equality & Law Reform John O'Donohue, Criminal
Justice (Release of Prisoners) Bill 1998, Second Stage, Dail Debates Official Report, July
2, 1998.
92. New Law Sees Six Freedfrom Portlaoise,IRIsH TIMES, Aug. 1, 1998; Man Convicted of
Murder of Mountbatten Is Freed, IIsH TIMES, Aug. 7, 1998 (visited Feb. 9, 1999) <http://
www.irish-times.com/paper2/16/990807/nnews/html> (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal).
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lied with the changed political landscape of the post-Agreement
era and the technical limitations of these smaller organizations,
proved highly successful. As of January 1999, only one of the
groups failed to observe a cease-fire.
The first such group in the post-Agreement era to declare a
cease-fire was the dissident Loyalist grouping, the LVF, who announced a cessation in May 1.998 during the run-up to the referenda." The LVF, formed as a breakaway from the larger UVF
and led by the former head of the Mid-Ulster UVF, Billy Wright,
had been bitterly opposed to the peace process and the political
direction taken by the UVF's political wing, the Progressive
Unionist Party. 4 When Billy Wright himself was murdered in
the Maze prison by the INLA in December 1997, the LVF retaliated with a number of random attacks on Catholic civilians and
continued its campaign of violence up until May 1998. The LVF
initially denied that it called its cease-fire in order to benefit
from the early release provisions. However, its Officer Commanding in the Maze subsequently demanded "parity of esteem
to prisoners from other organizations on cease-fire,"9 and its
spokesperson Pastor Kenny McClintock indicated a willingness
to engage on decommissioning in return for movement on
"prison conditions."9 6 Its cease-fire was ultimately accepted by
the British government on November 12, 1998, and the approximately twenty-five LVF prisoners became eligible to apply for release at that juncture.9 7
93. The soldiers of the LVF have fought against the Irish peace process and
the sell out of our country. This has not been an easy task especially when you
have all the different sides fighting against you. Northern Ireland has come to
a crucial part of its history, on the 22nd May people will vote for a United
Ireland through a yes or vote no to remain British and hold on to everything
Protestant people hold dear. . . . The LVF are now calling an unequivocal
cease-fire to create the proper climate in people's minds, so when they do go
to vote they will make the proper decision for Ulster and that is to vote no.
LVFAnnounces Unequivocal Cease-fire, IRISH NEws, May 15, 1998 (visited Mar. 13, 1999)
<http://www.irishnews.com/k archive/150598/news2.html> (on file with the Fordham
InternationalLaw Journal).
94. See generally CUSACK & McDONALD, supra note 7.
95. LVF Chief in Maze Confirms Cease-fire, IRISH TIMES, Aug. 12, 1998.
96. LVF Seeks Prison Deal, BELFAST TELEGRAPH, June 15, 1998.
97. Mo to Accept LVF Cease-fire: PrisonersJoin the Release Plan, BELFAST TELEGRAPH,
Nov. 12, 1998. The Government had been strongly encouraged to accept the bona
tides of the LVF cease-fire by Unionists including First Minister Designate David Trimble as the LVF had indicated a willingness (subsequently realized) to decommission a
small amount of weaponry. The Unionists believed that such a move by a Loyalist
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On the, Republican side, the INLA were the first of the dissident groupings to declare a cease-fire in the wake of the Agreement. The INLA is a small but ruthless Republican faction, who
despite tracing its ideological roots to the fusion of Republicanism and Socialism propagated by James Connolly, have nonetheless been involved in some of the most violent sectarian and internecine armed actions of the conflict.9 8 Its cease-fire was announced on August 24, 1998. Speaking from the Maze prison,
INLA Officer Commanding in the jail, Christopher McWilliams,
the man responsible for shooting Billy Wright in the prison the
previous year, argued that "securing releases has never been our
primary concern. At the end of the day, throughout the world
in every conflict political prisoners have been an issue. If anything does come about, we will be part of it, we are confident of
that."9 9 However much it weighed in their decision making-process, there was clearly an expectation amongst INLA prisoners
that they would benefit from the early release provisions. That
expectation was duly realized, in the Irish Republic at least, with
the announcement by the Irish government that "the INLA are
to be regarded as qualifying prisoners under the provisions of
the Good Friday Agreement."1 0 0 Given the decision with regard
to the LVF, it is presumably only a matter of time before the
British government follows suit in the North.
The most recent Republican grouping to declare a ceasefire was the Real IRA. The Real IRA was formed from the ranks
of the mainstream IRA following a split in 1997 about the ongoing peace process, and, in particular, the IRA's agreement that
Sinn F6in could sign up to the Mitchell principles of non-violence.10 1 Lead by a number of key figures from the mainstream
IRA, this small grouping was responsible for the Omagh bombparamilitary grouping would increase pressure on the IRA to reciprocate, although the
significance of the LVF weapons hand over was dismissed by the larger Loyalist
paramilitary groupings and Republicans. LVF Guns Handover Is a Stunt Says PUP, IRISH
NEWS, Dec. 19, 1999 (visited Mar. 13, 1999) <http://www.irishnews.com/karchive/
191298/nnews.html> (on file with the Fordham InternationalLaw Journal).
98. JACK HOLLAND & HENRY McDONALD, INLA: DEADLY DIVISIONS (1994).
99. See INLA's War Is Over, IRISH NEWS, Aug. 24, 1998 (visited Mar. 13, 1999)
<http://www.irishnews.com/karchive/240898/nnews.html> (on file with the Fordham
InternationalLaw Journal).
100. See INLA Prisoners to Be Freed, IRISH NEWS, Dec. 19, 1998 (visited Mar. 13, 1999)

<http://www.irishnews.com/kLarchive/191298/politics10.html>
ham InternationalLaw Journal).

101. See Staying Out in the Cold,

MAGILL, July,

1998.

(on file with the Ford-
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ing in August, which killed twenty-nine civilians and injured
scores more. After having "suspended operations" three days after the bombing and being under considerable pressure from
both the security forces North and South, and the mainstream
IRA, as well as being politically isolated from the Republican
community, the Real IRA also called a cease-fire on September
8, 1998.102 Real IRA sources have claimed to the media that if its
cease-fire holds it has an "understanding" with the Irish government, that most of its prisoners will be freed by the millennium,
except for those convicted of the Omagh bombing. 10 3
It is difficult to assess with accuracy the role that prisoner
release has played in the decisions of these smaller anti-peace
process groupings to halt violence. Clearly, their prisoners expect to benefit from the early release provisions. It could well be
argued that in a changed political landscape, where community
support for violence is considerably reduced and an alternative
non-violent direction is being offered, the release of prisoners
has become a more significant incentive than it might otherwise
have been.
2. Prisoner Release and Decommissioning: The Stick?
The insistence upon the prior decommissioning of paramilitary weapons before all party talks could commence is widely
viewed as having lead to the collapse of the first IRA cease-fire in
1996. This issue, again at the top of the political agenda, is imbued with symbolic importance to Unionists, Loyalists, and
Republicans. 0 4 For Unionists, it is portrayed as a litmus test of
the good faith of those seeking to move out of political violence.'0 ° For Loyalist and Republican paramilitaries, it is an act
imbued with notions of surrender and runs contrary to an ideology deep within both sets of paramilitary protagonists that views
102. SeeJane Bardon, Real IRA Cease-fire as PressureBites, IRISH NEws, Sept. 9, 1998
(visited Feb. 9, 1999) <http://www.irishnews.com/real/true.html> (on file with the
Fordham InternationalLaw Journal).
103. See Foiled Real IRA Gang to Be Freed by 2000, IRISH NEWS, Dec. 8, 1998 (visited
Feb. 9, 1999) <http://www.irishnews.com/k.archive/081298/politics8.html> (on file
with the Fordham InternationalLaw Journal).
104. See C. McInnes, The Decommissioning of Terrorist Weapons and the Peace Process in
Northern Ireland, 18 CONTEMP. SECUry POL'Y 3, 83-103 (1997); Michael Von Tangen
Page, Arms Decommissioning and the Northern Ireland Peace Agreement, 29 SECURITy DIALOGUE 4, 409-20 (1998).
105. See Trimble Remains in Ditch over Arms, IRISH TIMES, Dec. 29, 1998.
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such weapons as the final guarantors for the defense of their
communities against attack by its enemies.
Some commentators have suggested that the question of
prisoner release is connected to the provisions regarding prisoner release in the Agreement. 10 6 Although no such linkages
are made in the Agreement, considerable energies were expended by both Unionist and Conservative MPs in passing the
bill on prisoner release to make such a connection explicit. During the referendum, British Prime Minister Tony Blair made a
number of statements that went as close as possible to linking
the question of prisoner release to decommissioning, primarily
in order to "shore up" the hemorrhaging Unionist 'YES" vote,
without rewriting the Agreement. On May 6, he argued: "It is
essential that organizations that want to benefit from the early
release of prisoners should give up violence. Decommissioning
is part of that."'1 7 In a speech delivered at Balmoral showgrounds in Belfast on May 14, 1998, Blair argued that the provisions relating to prisoner release and the other elements of
agreement were underpinned by a number of safeguards.'
That speech allowed pro-Agreement Unionist such as David
Trimble to claim that "plain and direct linkage linking prison
release and office to a permanent end to violence and decommissioning is confirmed by the Prime Minister."0 9 However, as
106. See J. Ruane & J. Todd, Peace Processes and Communalism in Northern Ireland, in
178-95 (W. Grotty & D. Scmidt eds., 1998).
107. House of Commons, Official Report, May 6, 1998, col. 711.
108. Non-violent means must be established in an objective, meaningful and
verifiable way .... In clarifying whether the terms and spirit of the agreement
are being met and whether violence has been given up for good, there are a
range of factors to be taken into account; first and foremost ... that the socalled war is finished, done with, gone, the cease-fires are indeed complete
and unequivocal, an end to bombings, killings and beatings, claimed or unclaimed, and end to targeting and the procurement of weapons, progressive
dismantling of paramilitary structures actively directing and promoting violence, full co-operation with the Independent Commission on Decommissioning and no other organisations being deliberately used as proxies for violence.
These factors provide evidence upon which to base an overall judgement, a
judgement which will necessarily become more rigorous over time.
Statement by Prime Minister Tony Blair, reprinted in Blair Says Accord Points to Better Future; Full Text of BlairSpeech, IRISH TIMES, May 15, 1998 (visited Feb. 10, 1999) <http://
www.irishnews.com/karchive/150598/nnewsl.html> (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal).
109. Blair Boost to Yes Camp, IRISH NEWS, May 15, 1998 (visited Feb. 10, 1999)
<http://www.irishnews.com/karchive/150598/nnewsl.html> (on file with the FordIRELAND AND THE POLITICS OF CHANGE

ham InternationalLaw Journal).
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Trimble himself pointed out in the legislation that came before
the British Parliament, any such suggestions had been "lost in
translation."' 1 0
Like the Agreement, the relevant legislation contained no
such requirement. As Tory spokesperson Andrew McKay acknowledged at the time,
the Opposition pressed for substantial decommissioning to
take place before the early release of prisoners, and for this to
be incorporated into the legislation that is before us .... The
most serious omission is that it does not establish a clear legislative linkage between some actual decommissioning having
taken place and the accelerated release of prisoners."'
The Labour government has, to date, held firm that prisoner release is not linked to actual decommissioning. As Security Minister Adam Ingram told the House of Commons:
The early release of prisoners is an integral part of the Agreement, one which the government are honoring in full. The
government will not depart from the Agreement by introducing a direct linkage between decommissioning and prisoner
releases which is not in the Agreement nor in the Northern
Ireland (Sentences) Act 1998.112
As increasing numbers of prisoners have been released, the
government has come under sustained pressure to halt or to
slow down prisoner releases until actual decommissioning occurs
or, more recently, until an end to paramilitary punishment beatings and shootings is achieved. In an increasingly acrimonious
debate, Conservatives and Unionist are explicitly accusing the
Labour Government of mishandling the potential of using the
prisoners as "hostages" or bargaining chips in return for pro13
gress on other issues within the realm of the paramilitaries.1
While the logic of using prisoners as a stick with which to
prise concessions from or "defeat" paramilitaries is beguilingly
simple, it fails to address the complex dialectic between the
larger paramilitary organizations and their prisoners. Previous
110. House of Commons, Official Report, June 10, 1998, col. 1099.
111. House of Commons, Official Report, June 10, 1998, cols. 1093-94.
112. House of Commons, Official Report, Jan. 20, 1999, cols. 487-88.
113. See Frank Millar, Bipartisanship Under Mounting Strain, IRsH TIMES, Jan. 28,
1998 (visited Feb. 10, 1999) <http://www.irish-times.com/cgi-bin/highlight.plx?TextRes=BIpartisanship&Path=/Irish-times/paper/2/16/99/0128/99.html> (on file with
the Fordham InternationalLaw Journal).
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attempts at using prisoners in such a fashion, such as during the
Criminalization era of 1976 to 1981, were an unmitigated disaster in security and political terms. Greater pragmatism in the
management of prisons in the 1980s and 1990s, on the other
hand, undoubtedly contributed to an environment in which
paramilitaries began to consider strategies other than violence.
The history of political imprisonment in Ireland would suggest
that the handling of prisoners is an issue around which confidence can be built or eroded within the paramilitary constituency; it is not an issue that can be used to force concessions.
The conceptual lumping of different parts of the post conflict-resolution process is also unhelpful. For Republicans, the
issue of decommissioning is clearly linked to the question of demilitarization, withdrawal of British troops, the dismantling of
security installations, controls on legally held weapons by Unionists, and police reform. For the mainstream Loyalists (the UDA
and UVF), decommissioning is tied up with the actions and attitudes of Republicans and their capacity to attack the Loyalist
community. With regard to the question of punishment beatings and shootings, for Republicans the ending of such activities
is linked to the question of an agreed formal policing structure,
cultures of dependency on paramilitaries which have grown up
in working class communities, and the ability of local communities to take greater responsibility for "problem solving" in their
own areas. 1 4 While the phenomenon is arguably even more
complex in Loyalist areas,1 15 it is equally unconnected to the release of paramilitary prisoners. As Tony Blair has argued,
preventing prisoners release to force an end to punishments
"would have immense consequences for the prospects of lasting
peace.... [I] t may be an imperfect process but it is better than
no process at all."' 1 6
3. Prisoner Release and the Victims of Violence
One of the most difficult issues regarding the early release
of prisoners in the process of conflict resolution is the impact of
releases upon those who have been victims of the conflict. The
114. See generally JAMES

AULD ET AL., DESIGNING A SYSTEM OF COMMUNITY RESTORA-

(1997).
115. See Tom Winston, Alternatives to Punishment Beatings and Shootings in a Loyalist

TIVE JUSTICE IN NORTHERN IRELAND

Community in Belfast, 8 CRITICAL CRIMINOLOGY 1, 122-28 (1997).
116. See Millar, supra note 113.
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experiences of the victims of political violence in Northern Ireland and Britain are well documented.' 1 7 The social and psychological consequences for the victims or the families of victims of
a violent political conflict are severe." 8 The release of a prisoner who has served his full sentence can in itself be traumatic
for the family of those killed or injured by the prisoner.' 19
Where such releases occur earlier than laid down by the original
sentence, however, such feelings may be exacerbated. For this
research as well as prior research, the author has interviewed the
victims of politically-motivated violence, their organizations, and
spokespeople in Northern Ireland as well as in Italy, Spain,
South Africa, and Israel.120 Before outlining the broad themes
that emerged from those interviews, it is important, however, to
bear a number of things in mind.
First, the status of who is a "victim" in a violent political conflict is itself a contested issue, with some arguing that it should
be broadened beyond simply those injured or bereaved by the
actions of terrorist organizations. 121 Clearly, the actions of security forces kill and injure innocent people as well as combatants.
In Northern Ireland, over 360 people have been killed by the
security forces; half of them were unarmed and uninvolved civilians.1 22 Only four members of the security services have been
imprisoned for such offenses, and two of these have been re-

117. See MARIE-THERESA FEV ET AL., NORTHERN IRELAND'S TROUBLES: THE HUMAN
(1999); DENZIL McDANIEL, ENNISKILLEN: THE REMEMBRANCE SUNDAY BOMBING
(1997); COLIN PARRY & WENDY PARRY, TIM: AN ORDINARY BoY (1995).
118. D. Foster & D. Skinner, Detention and Violence: Beyond Victimology, in POLITICAL
VIOLENCE AND THE STRUGGLE IN SOUTH AFRICA (N.C. Manganyi & A. du Toit eds., 1990);
George Straker, Exploring the Effects of Interacting with Survivors of Trauma, 8 J. Soc. DEV.
COSTS

IN AR. 2, 33-47 (1993); D. KERSNER ET AL., TRAUMA IN AFFECTED PEOPLE BY POLITICAL
REPRESSION: CONCEPT AND APPROACH (1994); Andrew Dawes, The Emotional Impact of
Political Violence, in CHILDHOOD AND ADVERSITY (Andres Dawes & David Donald eds.,

1994).
119. See Mike Maguire, The Needs and Rights of Victims, 14 CRIME &JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH

363-433 (1991).

120. Gormally & McEvoy, supra note 9.
121. See OLIVER WILKINSON, NORTHERN IRELAND ASSOCIATION FOR THE CARE AND
RESETTLEMENT OF OFFENDERS, VICTIM SUPPORT IN NORTHERN IRELAND IN THE EARLY RELEASE OF POLITICALLY MOTIVATED PRISONERS:

RIENCE,

A

CONFERENCE REPORT

122. See
(1994).
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25-28 (1995).
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3
leased after serving less than four years of their life sentences. 12
While a government investigation into the needs of victims did
include reference to those killed or injured by state forces, 1 24 the
recent decision by Minister of Victims for Northern Ireland
Adam Ingram to meet with the families of IRA men killed by SAS
1 25
ambushes at Loughall has caused considerable controversy.
Nonetheless, such victims insist that they too have a right to have
126
their voices heard in discussions regarding prisoner release.

Second, international experience would suggest that the
views of victims regarding early release of prisoners are not
monolithic. For example, in South Africa, while there has been
some attention directed at those who were subject to human
rights abuses carried out by the ANC, 1 27 the main focus has been
upon the those who had suffered at the hands of the apartheid
regime. Official government policy has put the notion of retribution aside and acknowledged the dilemma of offering amnesty
to those convicted of human rights abuses. 1 28 In Italy, much of
the work concerning victims has been directed by church-based
organizations and appears closely bound up with the Catholic
notions of penance and atonement, including reconciliation between victims and individual prisoners. 29 . In Spain, the diversity
of victims' views are in effect represented through a variety of
organizations. A large Madrid-based organization, known as the
Association of the Victims of Terrorism, actively campaigns
against the reinsertion of prisoners who have renounced violence. 130 Other victims' organizations, largely based in the
Basque region, tend to be involved in the peace and reconcilia123. See D. Currie & B. MacLean, CriticalReflections on the PeaceProcess in Northern
Ireland, 3 HUMAN. & Soc'Y 19, 101-16.
124. See KENETH BLOOMFIELD, HER MAJESTY'S SATIONERY OFFICE, WE WILL REMEMBER THEM:

REPORT OF THE NORTHERN IRELAND VICTIM COMMISSIONER,

SIR KENETH

BLOOMFIELD (1998).

125. See Victim's Sister Slams Ingram for Talking With IRA Relatives, BELFAST TELEGRAPH, Jan. 25, 1999.

126. Interview with sister of IRA volunteer killed on active service by British
soldiers (Dec. 12, 1998).
127. SKWEYIYA COMMISSION, AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF ENQUIRY INTO COMPLAINTS BY FORMER AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS PRISONERS
AND DETAINEES

(1992).

128. See ALEX BORAINE, TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION, RONDELBOSCH:
JUSTICE IN TRANSMISSION (1994).

129. Interview with Father Guiseppe Brunetta (Jan. 30, 1995).
130. Interview with Juan Perez & Paulino Baena Diaz (Mar. 9, 1995).
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tion movements with both "Gesto por la Paz" and "Denon
Artean" accepting and supporting early release so long as prison1 31
ers have rejected violence.
In Northern Ireland, even those victims groupings that are
viewed as most hostile to the paramilitaries have acknowledged
the diversity of views among victims concerning prisoner release. 13 2 Some victims have argued that that they should have a
veto over any early release of prisoners.13 3 Others, often supported by anti-Agreement Unionist politicians, have made representations to the Sentence Review Commission expressing their
concerns regarding the releases.13 1 Still others handcuffed
themselves to the turnstiles at the Maze prison in protest of the
extension of Christmas parole to several high profile prisoners
including one IRA prisoner convicted of the murder of nine civilians in a bomb planted on the Shankill Road in 1993.135
On the other side of the debate, some high profile victims
have declared themselves in favor of early releases as part of a
broader process of healing reconciliation and forgiveness. Mrs.
Joan Wilson, wife of the deceased peace campaigner Senator
Gordon Wilson and mother of Marie Wilson, who was killed by
the Enniskillen bomb, suggested that prison releases should be
contemplated in such a context. 36 Other prominent peace activists such as Anne McCann and Pat Campbell who have lost
loved ones have spoken publicly of their support for prisoner
release as a component of "peace-building."1 3 71 Still others have
131. Interview with Inaki Garcia (Mar. 7, 1995); Interviews with Jesus Herrero &
Txema Urkijo (Mar. 8, 1995).
132. See FAMILIES AGAINST INTIMIDATION AND TERROR, THE FAIT SUBMISSION TO THE
NI VICTIMS' COMMISSION: "GIVING VICTIMS A FAIR DEAL" (1998).
133. ALAN McBRIDE, PROTESTANT AND CATHOLICS ENCOUNTER, A VICTIMS PERSPECTIVE IN PERSPECTIVES ON THE RELEASE OF POLITICALLY MOTIVATED PRISONERS IN NORTHA CONFERENCE REPORT 32-34 (1995).
134. See Claire McGahon, PrisonersBody Told of Concerns, BELFAST TELEGRAPH, Aug.
12, 1998 (visited Apr. 16, 1999) <http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/cgi-bin/ArchiveDate.cgl.html> (on file with the Fordham InternationalLaw Journal).
135. SeeJanet Devlin & Peter McVerry, Freed Prisoners Storm, BELFAST TELEGRAPH,
Dec. 23, 1998 (visited Apr. 16, 1999) <http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/cgi-bin/
ArchiveDate.cgi.html> (on file with the Fordham InternationalLawJournal).
136. See Noel McAdam, We Must UnderstandJail Releases, BELFAST TELEGRAPH, Oct.
14, 1996 (visited Apr. 16, 1999) <http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/cg-bin/ArchiveDate.cgi.html> (on file with the Fordham InternationalLaw Journal).
137. NORTHERN IRELAND ASSOCIATION FOR CARING AND RESETFLEMENT OF OFFENDERN IRELAND:
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argued that while they felt too emotionally close to the question
of early releases to come to a view either in favor or against, they
needed additional resources such as counseling, compensation,
and other support to cope with the trauma of the early releases. 138
At a late stage in the passage of the Sentences Act, the government agreed to insert a mechanism to ensure that victims
would be informed when prisoners responsible for or related to
their loss were to be released in order that they might prepare
themselves.1 39 However, that notification system has been criticized for having been managed by the Prison Service rather than
a professional agency working with victims.140 Confidence in its
operation has been further undermined by a number of hurtful
errors that have occurred, including the decision to release an
IRA prisoner on the tenth anniversary of the death of an RUC
officer for whose murder he had been convicted."' Clearly, the
process for early release of prisoners will remain difficult for
many of those bereaved and injured as a result of the conflict.
4. The Reintegration of Paramilitary Prisoners
"The Governments continue to recognise the importance of
measures to facilitate the reintegration of prisoners into the
community by providing support both prior to and after release,
including assistance directed towards availing of employment opportunities, re-training and/or re-skilling, and further education. "1142
The notion of "reintegrating" paramilitary prisoners has always been a problematic one for many politically-motivated prisoners. Many politicals have traditionally been reluctant to use
some of the services of professional reintegration agencies such
as the Probation or NIACRO, lest they be seen as acquiescing to
the label of "criminal.1 43 During the conflict and in the period
after the 1994 cease-fires, in asserting their status as political,
138. See

WILKINSON,

supra note 121.

139. House of Commons, Official Report, June 10, 1998, col. 1160.
140. Interview by BBC Radio Ulster "Morning Extra" with Oliver Wilkinson, Director Victim Support, Northern Ireland (Oct. 1998).
141. See Bingham: Halt the Releases, BELFAST TELEGRAPH, Jan. 23, 1999.
142. Good Friday Agreement, supra note 1, Prisoners 5.
143. Kieran McEvoy et al., The Home Front: The Familiesof Politically Motivated Prisoners in Northern Ireland, 39 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 2, 175-97 (1999).
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many paramilitary prisoners and their supporters argued that
they were not in need of reintegration. They argued that they
were not stigmatized by their communities and that they would
not have committed their "crimes" were it not for the political
circumstances in which they found themselves. 144 The professional agencies argued that such ideological struggles should be
145
ignored in the provision of practical services to prisoners.
As the peace process unfolded, prisoner groupings (and the
professional agencies) adapted their positions to one wherein
prisoners would take advantage of pre and post-release facilities.
The model for such reintegration was a "self help" model,
wherein the former prisoners themselves would take responsibility for the management and delivery of services. The European
Union Peace and Reconciliation Fund, which was established by
the European Union to support the peace process, made available £1.25 million to support prisoner reintegration in 1998.
These monies are distributed through the Belfast-based Northern Ireland Voluntary Trust, a vastly-experienced grant giving
14 6
agency in the non-profit sector.
Given that projects are established and run by and large according to paramilitary factions, there are now over twenty-six
community-based ex-prisoner projects spread throughout Northern Ireland.'4 7 Recently, IRA-affiliated Republicans established
an umbrella project, Coiste na n-Iarchimi, to manage a range of
their projects and appointed a manager from outside the ranks
of former Republican prisoners. 148 The work covered by reintegration projects include education, job skills programs, financial
and welfare advice, housing, and accommodation and family-ori144. See SINN FiN SUBMISSION TO THE FORUM FOR PEACE AND RECONCILATION (Jan.
20, 1995).
145. It is important to the peace process as a whole that the different ideological perspectives of government and of the prisoners about the reasons why
they are in prison be left aside and that we see prisoner reintegration as an

integral factor in rebuilding our communities. Further it will have to be
recognised that progress cannot be achieved without the active participation
of the prisoners themselves.
NORTHERN IRELAND ASSOCIATION FOR CARING AND RESETTLEMENT OF OFFENDERS, SUBMISSION TO THE FORUM FOR PEACE AND RECONCILIATION, Jan. 20, 1995.

146. NORTHERN IRELAND VOLUNTARY TRUST, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE NORTHERN
IRELAND VOLUNTARY TRUST (1998).

147. Data made available to the author by Northern Ireland Voluntary Trust.
148. See Prisoners Group Launched, IRISH NEWS, Jan. 20, 1999.
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entated counseling.1 4 9 While there has been some criticism of
the provision of EU funding to such projects,1 5 ° to date these
groups have not received substantial alternative funding. 1 5 1 The
real test of the commitments made in the agreement regarding
reintegration will come when the EU funding is exhausted and
prisoners groupings seek mainstream statutory monies.
CONCLUSION
"We are on the brink of securing the de facto recognition of
the political character of the conflict, a fact represented by the
release of political prisoners." 5' 2 In this important interview,
Padraig Wilson, IRA Officer Commanding in the Maze, underlined the symbolic importance of the prisoner issue. The Good
Friday Agreement has been famously described by the Deputy
First Minister Designate Seamus Mallon of the SDLP as "Sunningdale for slow learners."15 ' This reference is to the failed
1973 agreement, which contained a number of features similar
to the 1998 Agreement including a power sharing executive, limited cross-border cooperation, and the establishment of some
human rights and nondiscrimiation protections. 5 4 Such a description of the Good Friday Agreement, however, undersells its
complexity.
The Sunningdale process, like much of government policy
during the period of conflict, reflected a mindset that sought to
"re-establish normal constitutional politics in Northern Ireland,"
to build the center ground, and politically to marginalize and
then to contain the paramilitaries via an effective security policy.' 5 5 The Good Friday Agreement, on the other hand, is characterized by a desire to bring the bulk of "extremist" opinion
inside the process (admittedly made easier in 1998 by the presence of organized political parties representative of Republicanism and Loyalism). It represents an acceptance of the political
149. See L.

MCSHANE,

NORTHERN IRELAND VOLUNTARY TRUST, POLITICALLY MOTI-

VATED EX-PRISONERS SELF HELP PROJECTS, INTERIM REPORT (1998).

150. See Fury at Euro-Cashfor Ex-terrorists, OBSERVER, Jan. 10, 1999.
151. See Peace Pays Paltry Dividendfor Victims and Ex-prisoners, IRELAND ON SUNDAY,
Aug. 17, 1998.
152. IRA Chief in the Maze Is Ready to Seek a New Way Out, FIN. TIMES, June 17, 1998.
153. A Favourite Cumudgeon, IRISH TIMES, Oct. 20, 1998.
154. See KENETH BLOOMFIELD, STORMONT IN CRISIS: A MEMOIR (1994).
155. See MICHAELJ. CUNNINGHAM, BRITISH GOVERNMENT POLICY IN NORTHERN IRELAND 1969-1989: ITS NATURE AND ITS EXECUTION (1991).
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motivation of paramilitaries, an implicit acknowledgement of
the state as a protagonist in the conflict, and a preference for
politics over "security"-all of which underscore and are informed by a recognition of the political nature of the conflict.
Von Tangen Page has suggested that the more pragmatic
approach adopted by the Irish government with respect to the
question of prisoner release, when compared to the approach
taken by its British counterpart, was because the Irish state had
not been directly targeted by the IRA campaigning.1 56 Quite
apart from the numerous acts of violence which occurred in the
Republic during the conflict, such an analysis fails to take account of the political and ideological insights into the respective
states provided by prisoner releases. While the Republic utilized
harsh anti-terrorist laws, banned Sinn Fain from the airwaves for
almost two decades, and occasionally treated paramilitary prisoners in a severe and brutal manner, there appeared little doubt
that the conflict was anything other than political among the key
government protagonists.1 5 7 For the British state, on the other
hand, from at least 1976 onwards, the separation of the political
and security arena into two distinct sets of discourses and practices meant that key state actors appeared to "lose sight" of the
political character of the conflict. The mismanagement of the
peace process by the John Major Government, notwithstanding
its need for Unionist support at West Minster, represents at some
level a state's failure to move beyond the "conflict mode" of security discourses to an acceptance of the political character of
the conflict required for effective peace-building.
In a violent political struggle, the treatment of prisoners is a
mirror to the state's view of the conflict. The internment of suspects without trial and the granting of special category status to
prisoners in the early 1970s, the removal of such status in 1976,
the attempts at criminalization until the early 1980s, and the policies of managerial pragmatism in the 1980s, all offer insights
into the British government's ideological and political approach
to the conflict during those eras. 151 While the current British
government has also maintained the fiction that "there are no
156. See MICHAEL VON TANGEN PAGE, PRISONS, PEACE & TERRORISM 164 (1998).
157. See GERARD HOGAN & CLIVE WALKER, POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND THE LAW IN
IRELAND (1989); F. FINLEY, SNAKES AND LADDERS (1998); K. WHELAN & E. MASTERSON,
BERTIE AHERN: TAOISEACH & PEACEMAKER (1998).
158. See Brian Gormally & Kieran McEvoy, Politics and Prison Management: The
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political prisoners in British prisons, the willingness of the Labour government to sensibly engage on the prisoners issue is indicative of a mindset that has made the necessary transformation
for conflict resolution."
Acceptance of the political motivation of paramilitaries does
not imply either approval or appeasement. Neither Republicans
nor Loyalists have achieved the stated objectives-of their respective campaigns of violence. What it does entail, however, is an
ability to distinguish the securitocratic rhetoric of criminalization, to understand that unpalatable measures such as prisoner
release are necessary in a process of conflict resolution, and to
recognize that reform of certain structural elements of the state,
such as policing and the criminal justice system, are prerequsite
foundations for a new society. If power is to be devolved to the
Northern Assembly in the next few months, then the next key
step will be to try to ensure that the British and Irish governments acknowledgement of the political character of the conflict
is spread more evenly among the Northern Ireland politicians.
It is no accident that the greatest obstacle to the Unionist
Yes campaign was the issue of prisoner release. At one level, one
might attribute this to the horrors of the past thirty years and the
atrocities carried out by the IRA and other Republican groupings. Such an explanation is inadequate, however, as it ignores
the fact that Nationalists voted overwhelmingly for an agreement
which saw Loyalist prisoners released, despite the indiscriminate
nature of Loyalists attacks on Catholics throughout the conflict.
Another explanation, equally unconvincing, is the respective influence of Catholicism and Protestantism within Nationalism
and Unionism. Such a view mightjuxtapose the variant theological emphasizes within the two religious blocks, the former with
its new testament emphasis on forgiveness and redemption, the
latter with its old testament focus upon punishment and retribution.' 5 9 As with most religious explanations of Northern Ireland,
such views do not stand up to analysis beyond the crudest generalizations.
The key difference between the communities on the prisNorthern IrelandExperience, in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN CRIMINOLOGY 276-314 (L.Noaks
et al. eds., 1995).
159. For a range of discussions on the interplay between religion and other sociopolitical aspects of attitutdes towards punishment, see DARIo MELOSsI, THE SOCIOLOGY
OF PUNISHMENT: SOCIO-STRUCTURAL PERSPECTIVE (1998).
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oner issue may be attributed to their very different understandings of the conflict. For many Unionists, "terrorism" was an aberration on the body politic, a problem perpetuated by a few
irredentist "men of violence" for whatever combination of criminal or psychopathic reasons. With little support or sympathy for
Loyalist prisoners beyond the narrow electoral base of the fringe
Loyalist parties, and no comparable historical experience of
political imprisonment to the nationalist community in Ireland,
the mainstream Unionist view of "terrorist" violence was sustained and nurtured by the official discourses of the state. Security force members were not protagonists to the conflict but
rather upholding "law and order" in the face of vicious attack on
democracy.
While the state has transformed, or at least modified its
views, Unionist attitudes (both pro and anti-Agreement) have
been predictably slow to follow suit. Demands for the "surrender" of weapons, security "crackdowns," exclusion of the parties
associated with paramilitarism, minimal change in the security
forces etc., these all continue to dominate Unionist dialogue.
While issues such as the release of prisoners remain within the
remit of the British government, their potential for "tripping up"
the process of peace-building would appear to be limited. However, in the coming months and years, unless a transformation
similar to that experienced by the British spreads to the Unionist
body politic, the Good Friday Agreement will have some troubled times ahead.

